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ABSTRACT: There is a consensus, in 
both academia and economic policy 
circles, that the reform of the personal 
income tax system in Serbia is necessary 
one. Two frequently discussed reform 
scenarios are East European style flat 
tax and the comprehensive income tax 
model of Western Europe. Most Central 
and Eastern European (CEE) countries 
have recently reformed their income tax 
systems by introducing some form of flat 
tax scheme, while in numerous countries 
of Western Europe the possibility of flat 
tax reform is also seriously considered. 
Opponents of the reform usually stress 
the adverse distributional effects of flat 
tax schemes. The aim of our paper is to 
contribute to the empirical literature on 
the distributional effects of alternative tax 
reform scenarios. The analysis is based on 
the tax and benefit micro-simulation model 
for Serbia (SRMOD). The results suggest 
that redesigning the existing income tax 
system so as to introduce a uniform tax rate 
and increase the basic allowance would 
somewhat reduce inequality and improve 
vertical inequity in taxation. On the other 
hand, in the case of the introduction of 
comprehensive income tax, considerably 
larger equalizing and progressivity effects 
would be achieved. At the same time, since 
in both cases redistribution will not affect 
the bottom decile group, no significant 
effects (in either cases) on poverty reduction 
will be achieved.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Fundamental tax reforms have been on the political agenda during the last couple 
of years in many Western European countries. Since the publication of Hall and 
Rabushka’s (1995) paper there has been a lively debate in academic and policy 
circles on options to make the tax system more simple and efficient by introducing 
flat tax schemes. Unlike Western European countries, which still mostly apply 
some form of comprehensive or (semi) dual income tax, over the last decade 
many CEE countries have actually introduced some form of flat tax scheme. The 
primary aim was to simplify existing tax systems, but also to accelerate economic 
growth. In Russia there was a noticeable increase in tax compliance following 
the reform (Ivanova et al., 2005), whereas in Slovakia the simplification of the 
tax law has improved its transparency and business-friendliness. Soon after, the 
country’s credit rating was upgraded (to A, assessed by Standard & Poor) and 
became the best in the CEE region (Sklenar and Burger, 2006). 
At the beginning of the 1990s, due to increasing capital mobility and capital 
income tax evasion (particularly dividend and interest), Nordic countries 
performed dualization of their income tax system. This implied introduction 
of a flat tax rate on income from capital, and progressive tax rates on labour 
income. This model of income tax reform was aimed at increasing national 
savings and inflow of capital from abroad, and reducing tax compliance and tax 
administration costs, since the number of annual income tax returns declined. A 
similar approach (of introduction of some form of semi-dual income tax) was also 
analyzed and undertaken in some other European countries (Slovenia, Hungary, 
the Netherlands, etc.) in the mid-2000s. However, for the purpose of this paper 
we will focus solely on flat tax and comprehensive income tax. 
Flat tax reforms are usually expected to have a positive effect on efficiency, GDP 
growth, and employment. On the other hand, opponents of the reform usually 
stress the adverse distributional effects of flat tax schemes. It is often argued that 
the flat tax scheme is less efficient in tackling inequality than the comprehensive 
income tax system. Since none of the Western European countries (except 
Iceland) have yet introduced a flat tax scheme, the economic and distributional 
consequences of potential reforms have usually been analyzed by using simulation 
techniques. 
The intention of our paper is to contribute to the empirical literature on the 
distributional and poverty effects of flat tax and comprehensive income tax, 
by focusing on recent income tax reform proposals in Serbia. The aim of our TAX EFFECTS ON INEQUALITY AND POVERTY
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empirical research is to determine if the difference in the size of the distributional 
effects of these two income tax models is sufficiently large to affect the final 
decision on the income tax reform scenario to be implemented. We analyse the 
effects of revenue neutral tax reforms on income inequality and (vertical) equity 
in taxation. We also investigate the potential effects of these reform scenarios 
on poverty. Our analysis is based on a tax and benefit micro-simulation model 
for Serbia (SRMOD). All scenarios assume full compliance, and as such do not 
estimate potential changes in tax evasion. 
With its socio-demographic structure, Serbia is often regarded as a typical 
Western Balkan country. Given that the tax and benefit systems of these 
economies share many common features, especially among former Yugoslav 
republics, the qualitative results of our analysis could be of interest to a wide 
range of countries in the region. 
Our main results suggest that replacing the current income tax structure by a 
flat tax scheme would somewhat reduce inequality and improve vertical equity. 
However, when comprehensive income tax is introduced, we observe considerably 
larger equalizing effects. At the same time, since in both cases redistribution will 
not affect the bottom decile group, we do not observe any significant effects (in 
either case) on poverty reduction.
The paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the empirical 
literature on the distributive effects of income tax reforms. Section 3 describes 
the data and explains the methodology. A short preview of the current personal 
income tax system and proposed income tax reform scenarios is presented in 
Section 4. The distributional effects of these reform scenarios are given in Section 
5, and the poverty effects in Section 6. The last section concludes. 
2. DISTRIBUTIONAL EffECTS Of INCOME TAX REfORM IN THE LITERATURE
Empirical studies performed in developed countries that apply comprehensive 
(strongly progressive) income tax systems have found that replacing current tax 
schemes with the flat tax model would generate considerable negative effects in 
income distribution. Decoster et al. (2008), using the European tax-and-benefit 
micro-simulation model (EUROMOD), show that introduction of a flat tax would 
reduce the progressivity of the Belgian tax system. The lowest income deciles 
would lose out, while the higher income earners would gain from the reform. On 
the other hand, after additionally applying a micro-econometric labour supply 10
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model, they observe some positive labour supply incentives. Gains in efficiency, 
according to their estimates, are not sufficiently high to offset the adverse effects 
on income distribution. 
In a study for the Netherlands, Jacobs, et al (2007), using the applied general 
equilibrium model, find that non-linear income tax is more efficient than a 
linear (flat) tax in achieving redistributive goals. Also, if a flat tax is designed to 
maintain the current level of inequality it would trigger a negative labour supply 
response, and vice versa. In a similar manner, using US data, Diaz-Gimenez and 
Pijoan-Mas (2006) have studied two revenue-neutral flat-tax reform scenarios. 
These scenarios differ in the tax rates and in the amounts of exemptions. The 
authors conclude that the less progressive flat-tax scenario would be more 
efficient than the current tax system, since it would lead to higher output and 
labour productivity. Improved efficiency would, however, come at the price of 
more unequal distribution of earnings and after-tax income. In a study based on 
a simulation model for the German tax and transfer system, Fuest et al (2008) 
find that in both flat tax scenarios (which were subject to research) the top income 
decile benefits at the expense of the upper middle class. 
Studies in the new EU member states confirm prior results. Paulus et al (2009a) 
have simulated in EUROMOD different flat tax scenarios for Estonia, Hungary, 
and Slovenia. Their results indicate that in Hungary and Slovenia the introduction 
of the flat tax schemes would significantly increase the tax burden on the bottom 
deciles. Additionally, tax reform would increase inequality and poverty in both 
countries. The impact on inequality and poverty would not be so pronounced in 
Estonia since the country already has implemented some form of flat tax system 
and has a relatively high level of inequality. At the same time it is estimated that 
flat tax reforms would reduce effective marginal tax rates by 4-9 percentage 
points, which could improve work incentives or lead to higher tax compliance. 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
During the last decades Public Economics literature has developed very useful 
tools to analyse and evaluate the equity and efficiency effects of tax and benefit 
reforms. On the one hand, the theoretical analysis has experienced substantial 
progress with the appearance of the Mirrlees model of optimum taxation. This 
model provides a key framework for identifying the elements that determine the 
effects of direct taxes and cash benefits on equity and efficiency. At the same time, TAX EFFECTS ON INEQUALITY AND POVERTY
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development of the tax-benefit microsimulation models and the labour-supply 
models have enabled high-quality empirical research (Atkinson, 2009) 
To evaluate the effects of income tax reform on inequality and equity we use the 
tax and benefit microsimulation model for Serbia (SRMOD), which is based on 
the EUROMOD platform1. Like other tax-benefit models, SRMOD operates on 
micro-data for a representative sample of households, within the population to 
be observed. The Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) from 2007 is 
currently used as the SRMOD dataset. This dataset was chosen since it includes 
detailed information both on various sources of income and on paid taxes and 
claimed benefits2. This allows micro-validation (comparison of simulated and real 
values of benefits at the household level) to be conducted with greater accuracy, 
thus enabling a more reliable estimate of the model’s conformity with the actual 
tax system and benefit policy. Using elements of income from the survey data 
and combining them with simulated taxes and benefits, the model calculates 
disposable income for each household (see Scheme 1). The basic SRMOD output 
therefore consists of information on changes in disposable income of households 
after certain policy reforms are introduced. The model shows distribution of 
household original and disposable income, and the tax-benefit components of 
these incomes by deciles.3 Additional statistics provided in the model include 
the percentage of people below the poverty line (headcount ratio) for the overall 
population and for selected groups, and the Gini coefficient for equivalent 
original and disposable income.
1  EUROMOD is the tax and benefit microsimulation model for the European Union, developed 
and maintained by the mico-simulation unit of the Institute for Social and Economic 
Research (ISER), University of Essex. More details are available at:
  http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/research/euromod. For more details about SRMOD construction, 
see Žarković-Rakić (2010). 
2  For examle, in the LSMS the receipt of social assistence, unemployment benefit, and maternity 
leave benefit is reported separately, whereas in the Household Budget Survey there is only one 
question regarding the receipt of these three benefits. 
3  Decile groups are formed by ranking according to equalised household disposable income 
using the modified OECD equivalence scale and weighted by household size.12
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Scheme 1.  Main Income Concepts in EUROMOD 
Original income (employment and self-employment income, income from 
agriculture, income from capital, income from property (rent)) 
+   Social benefits (family benefits, pensions, unemployment benefit, social 
assistance benefits, housing benefits)
–  Social Insurance Contributions (employee, self-employed)
–  Personal Taxes (income and other direct taxes)
= Disposable Income
Source:  Paulus et al. (2009b)
Since the baseline tax-benefit policy year and income data reference period are 
the same, there was no need for income uprating. The only modification to the 
original dataset was net-to-gross imputations: since the original dataset recorded 
incomes net of taxes, we have performed tax-benefit calculations in order to 
compute gross incomes. 
4.   PERSONAL INCOME TAX IN SERBIA –  
THE CURRENT SITUATION AND PROPOSED REfORM SCENARIOS
In Serbia combined income tax with a strong scheduler (proportional) 
component is applied, which is different from developed countries where some 
form of comprehensive income tax system (with progressive tax brackets) exists. 
Since 2000 there has been a thorough reform of almost all major taxes in Serbia. 
Radical changes have been made in sales tax (VAT introduced), excise duties, 
social security contributions, and corporate income tax. Although the new 
Personal Income Tax Law was adopted in 2001, no fundamental changes have 
been introduced. Therefore, in Serbia the so-called combined income tax system 
(a mix of scheduler and comprehensive income tax) still applies. It is commonly 
accepted, in both academia and policy circles, that the reform of the personal 
income tax system in Serbia is necessary. Two frequently discussed reform 
scenarios are the East European style flat tax and the comprehensive income tax 
model. In its pure theoretical (Hall-Rabushka) form, a flat tax regime implies that 
income from labour is taxed at a flat rate (without exemptions and allowances, 
other than personal exemptions), whereas income from capital is exempted, in 
order to eliminate double taxation. In practice, however, most Central and East 
European flat tax countries have also included capital income in the tax base. At 
the same time, in some of them the tax exemptions list is extended by certain 
allowances for dependent family members. TAX EFFECTS ON INEQUALITY AND POVERTY
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A baseline scenario in our microsimulation analysis refers to the personal tax 
system which was in force in Serbia in 2007 (since the data set is related to 2007). 
After 2007 certain non- crucial amendments to the income tax system were 
made4. As mentioned above, since 2001 in Serbia the combined income tax model 
has applied (a combination of strong scheduler and comprehensive income tax). 
This means that incomes from various sources are taxed at the moment they are 
generated, at different tax rates (see Table 1).
Table 1.  Personal Income Tax Rates in Serbia
Source of income Statutory 
rate (%)
Deductible costs/ 
non-taxable 
amounts
Effective tax 
rates (%)
Income from self-employment 10 - 10
Salary/wage 12 non-taxable limit 
- RSD 5,050 10.4¹
Income from agriculture and 
forestry 14 - 14
Income from authorship rights, 
related rights, and intellectual 
property rights
20 34%, 43%, 50% 10, 11.4, 13.2
Income from capital 20 - 0, 16, 20²
Income from immovable property 20 20% 16
Capital gains 20 - 0, 20
Other income 20 20% 16
1) Effective tax rate on average monthly salary in Serbia paid in April 2007
2) Interest on dinar deposits are tax exempted. Dividends received by residents are taxed at the 
rate of 20%, on the tax base equal to 80% of gross dividend (i.e., effective tax rate is 16%). 
Source:  Personal Income Tax Law
Individuals whose total annual income exceeds a certain threshold (three times 
the average annual salary in Serbia) are also obliged to pay annual income tax 
at progressive tax rates (10% and 15%). Since less than 1% of the total number of 
taxpayers actually pays the annual income tax, the equalizing capacity of annual 
income tax is very low.
The LSMS contains data on individuals’ income generated in one month. Since 
personal income levels may differ during the year due to seasonality, accurate 
4  In 2010 deductible costs for calculation of tax on income from authorship rights were 
changed, and tax rates on income from capital and capital gains were reduced to 10%.14
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modelling of annual income tax in SRMOD was not feasible. However, given the 
fact that a negligibly small share of taxpayers actually pay annual income tax in 
Serbia, we believe that omitting to simulate this component of the tax system did 
not make it much different from the real tax schedule. Finaly, since more than 
three quarters of individuals’ total income in Serbia stems from employment (in 
the form of salary/wage) and that for the most taxpayers salary tax represents 
their final income tax payment, the current system in Serbia may be regarded as 
a form of flat tax.
Although several options for reform of personal income tax in Serbia are being 
discussed, our microsimulation analysis will be focused on two scenarios: 
redesigned flat tax and comprehensive income tax.
Flat rate taxes may differ considerably in their design. Only flat tax without any 
tax relief can be regarded as a “pure” flat tax, as in this case tax payments are 
proportional to incomes. At present only Georgia and Bulgaria have flat income 
tax as such. In all other cases a flat rate personal income tax is an indirectly 
progressive tax schedule with a basic tax allowance and a uniform marginal tax 
rate (Fuest el al, 2008). Design of a hypothetical tax refom scenario crucially 
depends on the objective of the reform. Given that in this paper we focus on 
ways to improve income equality using tax policy instruments, we decided to 
almost double the zero tax bracket (as compared to the current baseline scenario). 
The allowance of RSD 9,000 now equals the absolute poverty line estimated for 
2007, based on LSMS data. Moreover, looking at the actual design of flat tax 
policy (in Estonia, for example) and/or flat tax reform scenarios simulated in the 
work of Decoster et al (2008) and Paulus et al (2009a), we opted for additional 
allowances for dependants to the amount of RSD 4,000 (per child). Finally, the 
revenue neutrality requirement imposed in similar studies (Davies and Hoy 
(2002); Decoster et. al (2008), Paulus et. al (2009a), Diaz-Gimenez and Pijoan-
Mas, (2006), Fuest et al. 2008) implies a uniform tax rate of 15%. 
A comprehensive income tax reform scenario has also been discussed in academia 
and policy circles. Bearing in mind the subject matter of our paper and the fact 
that the vertical equity of the current tax system in Serbia is judged to be very low, 
our reform scenario is the following: family income from all sources, decreased 
by the basic monthly allowance of RSD 8,000 (per earner), the monthly allowance 
for dependent children of RSD 4,000 (per child), and itemized deductions for 
the full amount of medical educational expenses (up to RSD 4,000 per month), 
is taxed at the progressive tax rates of 12% and 22%. The rate of 12% is applied to 
family taxable income up to RSD 35,000, while the exceeding amount is taxed at TAX EFFECTS ON INEQUALITY AND POVERTY
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the rate of 22%. This reform scenario is also designed to yield equal tax revenue 
as the baseline scenario.
5. DISTRIBUTIONAL EffECTS
The analysis of the distributional effects of tax reform should answer two 
questions: 
a) What would be the impact of each of these reform scenarios on inequality? 
This topic is to be analysed based on the value of the Gini coefficient, as the 
standard measure of inequality.
b) If the redistribution takes place, who will be better off and who will be worse 
off? This question will be answered based on the changes in disposable income 
across the deciles, after each of the reform scenarios is implemented.
Since the effects of income tax on inequality are highly dependent on the level of 
progressivity of the tax system, we will also analyse the potential effects of each 
of these reform scenarios on progressivity.
5.1. Effects of income tax reform on inequality – Gini-based approach
The information on the Gini coefficient (measured on the basis of disposable 
income) illustrates total income inequality in the country, which is the result of 
market processes and public policies. However, the analysis of effectiveness of tax 
and benefit policies (which serves as the information base for the policy making 
process) may be derived from the data on the structure of the Gini coefficient, 
i.e., from the data on the effects of particular policy instruments on the Gini 
coefficient.
Table 2.  Effects of tax and benefit policies on the Gini coefficient
Current income 
tax system
Flat 
tax
Comprehensive 
income tax
Gini coefficient – original income  0.470  0.470  0.470
 - effects of income tax on Gini  -0.008 -0.012 -0.015
 - effects of social contributions on Gini  -0.003 -0.004 -0.005
 - effects of benefits on Gini  -0.108 -0.107 -0.107
Gini coefficient - disposable income  0.351  0.347  0.343
Source:  Authors’ calculations in SRMOD16
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The results presented in Table 2 indicate that inequality stemming from market 
processes is relatively high, but still within the range of other European countries: 
the Gini coefficient measured on the basis of original (market) income amounts 
to 0.47. At the same time the average before-tax and before-transfers “market 
income” Gini coefficient in developed countries ranges between 0.34 and 0.54 
(average value is 0.44). The results also suggest that the tax and benefit policies in 
Serbia make a significant impact on reduction of inequality of income distribution, 
i.e., total inequality (measured based on disposable income) is reduced by 
approximately 25%. However, according to the data for OECD countries, tax and 
benefit policies in these countries cut the Gini coefficient by approximately 33%, 
which suggests that there is a room for further improvement in the redistributive 
features of Serbian tax and benefit policies. 
The structure of the Gini coefficient in Serbia suggests that social assistance 
(benefit) policies are far more efficient in reducing inequality than the tax policy 
instrument, which is in line with results in other European countries. As a result 
of benefit policies the Gini coefficient in Serbia is reduced by approximately 
0.108, whereas income tax and social contributions trigger a decline in the Gini 
coefficient of 0.008 and 0.003 respectively. 
Our result shows that redesigning the current PIT system to introduce a 
uniform tax rate of 15% and increase the general allowance to RSD 9,000 would 
considerably increase the redistributive effects of income tax (the effect of income 
tax on the decline of the Gini coefficient would increase to 0.012).5 On the other 
hand, introduction of a comprehensive income tax system would trigger even 
larger redistributive effects, since under that scenario the income tax would 
trigger a fall in the Gini coefficient of 0.015. This means that comprehensive 
income tax would perform much better than flat tax in terms of redistribution 
and inequality reduction. However, the difference would not be significant, in 
absolute terms. 
We should keep in mind that the equalizing effects of the personal income tax 
system in Serbia, both the current one and the proposed tax reform scenarios, are 
considerably lower than in EU countries. The data for 19 EU member countries 
(included in the EUROMOD system) show that, on average, income tax systems 
in these countries reduce the Gini coefficient by 0.044 (Paulus et al, 2009b), which 
5  These results are in line with the results for other flat tax countries (e.g., Estonia does not 
show a significantly smaller equalizing effect of personal income tax in comparison with 
other countries). See Paulus et al (2009a)TAX EFFECTS ON INEQUALITY AND POVERTY
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is approximately nine times more than the current PIT system in Serbia does, and 
three to four times more than proposed tax systems would generate. This implies 
that, if the intention of the tax reform is to address inequality in the country, 
actual reform scenarios should be even more progressive than the current policy 
propositions. 
5.2. Effects of income tax reform on inequality – income composition approach
The analysis of the redistribution effects of tax reform based on the Gini coefficient 
provides information on the size and direction of changes in inequality, but still 
provides no information on the losers and winners from the reform. This can 
be determined based on the information on the change in income distribution 
before and after tax reform across the deciles.
Table 3.  Income distribution per decile
% of total disposable income
Current income 
tax system Flat tax Comprehensive 
income tax
Quintile share ratio 
(80/20) 6.98 6.82 6.71
1 1.9 2.0 2.0
2 4.0 4.1 4.1
3 5.4 5.5 5.5
4 6.8 6.8 6.9
5 8.0 8.0 8.1
6 9.1 9.1 9.2
7 10.7 10.7 10.7
8 12.6 12.6 12.7
9 15.5 15.5 15.5
10 26.0 25.7 25.3
Source:  Authors’ calculations in SRMOD
According to the results of our microsimulation analysis, under the current PIT 
scheme in Serbia the three bottom decile groups possess approximately 11.4% of 
the total disposable income, whereas the top three deciles generate 54.1% of total 
disposable income (see Table 3). 18
Economic Annals, Volume LVI, No. 190 / July – September 2011
Graph 1:  Change in disposable income per decile groups after tax reform
Source:  Authors’ calculations in SRMOD
However, replacement of the currently applied PIT system with a flat tax would 
trigger redistribution of 0.4% of total disposable income (see Graph 1). Individuals 
in decile groups 2, 3, 4, and 6 would be better off after the flat tax reform, while 
individuals in decile groups 9 and 10 would be worse off (their disposable income 
would decline by 0.1% and 0.3% of total disposable income respectively). On the 
other hand, in the case of introduction of comprehensive income tax, 0.7% of total 
disposable income would be redistributed and the full burden of redistribution 
would be borne by the richest individuals (those in the top decile). At the same 
time, benefits from the redistribution would be almost equally distributed across 
decile groups 2 to 8. The results depicted in Graph 1 also indicate that under both 
tax reform scenarios the disposable income of the bottom decile group remains 
unchanged. This is due to offsetting the effects of an increase in tax rates and 
increase/introduction of the basic allowance, dependent children allowances, 
and itemized deductions. 
These results suggest that, under both reform scenarios, the redistribution will 
be performed at the expense of the richest and for the benefit of the middle class. 
The only significant difference between these two reform scenarios refers to the 
size of redistribution. A larger amount of income would be redistributed after the 
introduction of the comprehensive income tax scheme than in the case of flat tax 
reform.
The conclusion on the positive redistributive effects of tax reform is also confirmed 
by the quintile share ratio 80/206. The ratio would decline from 6.98 before tax 
6  This ratio equals total income disposable to the top two deciles divided by total income 
disposable to the bottom two deciles.TAX EFFECTS ON INEQUALITY AND POVERTY
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reform to 6.82 after the flat tax reform or to 6.72 under comprehensive income 
tax reform. This also implies that comprehensive income tax would bring a larger 
decrease in inequality than the flat tax reform scenario.
The reform of income tax would change the Effective Marginal Tax Rate (EMTR), 
both average and across deciles, which is associated with the change in tax 
evasion. Since it is expected that comprehensive income tax would trigger a larger 
change (probably a decline) in the EMTR than flat tax, we believe that this would 
result in a larger decrease in tax evasion than in the case of flat tax reform. Given 
that the elasticity of non-reported income to EMTR is usually small (bellow 0.5) 
and the changes in EMTRs due to tax reforms are expected to be modest, it is 
our estimate that taking into account tax evasion response would not change the 
major conclusions related to the inequality effects of these two reform scenarios. 
5.3. Progressivity of income tax before and after reform
The redistributive power of income tax stems from the progressivity level, which 
is also regarded as an indicator of vertical equity in taxation. The common 
approach to evaluation of vertical equity in taxation refers to computation and 
the analysis of tax progressivity. Although there are many different methods for 
measurement of tax progressivity, we will focus on the two approaches usually 
applied in contemporary empirical studies: pattern of average tax rate (ATR) by 
income level and standard progressivity indices. 
Graph 2:  Average tax rate per decile groups
Source:  Authors’ calculations in SRMOD20
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Progressivity is defined as the situation when increase in income level is associated 
with a rise in average tax rate (ratio of tax liability and gross income). Therefore, 
the slope of the average tax rate/income may be used as a rough indicator of the 
progressivity of income tax (the higher the slope is, the greater the progressivity 
level). 
Since the slope of the ATR/income curve is higher for flat tax reform compared 
to the current income tax system, it can be concluded that introduction of the flat 
tax would increase the progressivity of the tax system (see Graph 2). However, 
introduction of the comprehensive income tax would imply an even larger 
increase in progressivity, since the slope of the respective ATR path is even higher 
than in case of flat tax reform. 
This approach is useful for graphical disposition of progressivity of the tax system. 
However, in order to make precise comparison of progressivity levels across tax 
policy scenarios, it is necessary to calculate respective progressivity indices. The 
family of these indices is broad, since each of the particular indicators has certain 
drawbacks. Therefore, contemporary empirical studies usually exploit two or 
more complementary measures. For the purpose of the analysis of the level of 
tax progressivity in this paper we have selected the two most commonly used 
indicators: the Musgrave-Thin index and Kakwani index.
The Musgrave-Thin progressivity index (PMT index) belongs to the family of 
progressivity indices which are based on the Gini coefficient. If G(xn) stands 
for the post-tax Gini coefficient, while G(xg) is the pre-tax Gini coefficient, the 
Musgrave-Thin index is calculated in the following manner:
 (1)
Critical value of PMT index is 1, which indicates that the tax system is proportional. 
If the value of PMT index exceeds 1, the tax system is regarded as progressive (the 
higher PMT index is, the more progressive is the system), while in case the PMT 
index is below 1, the system is regressive. 
The Kakwani progressivity index is also a progressivity indicator, based on the 
Gini coefficient and concentration curve. This index is calculated as the difference 
between tax concentration index (CT) and pre-tax Gini coefficient G(xg):7
7  See: Kakwani. N. (1977)TAX EFFECTS ON INEQUALITY AND POVERTY
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PK = CT – GX (2)
The Kakwani tax progressivity index may range from -2 to 1. A positive value of 
this index indicates that the tax system is progressive. 
Graph 3.  Effects of income tax reform on progressivity
Source:  Authors’ calculations in SRMOD
The results that we get based on both progressivity indices are convergent. 
According to our results, the current PIT system in Serbia is only slightly 
progressive (PMT only slightly departs from 1, while PK is close to 0). However, 
one should bear in mind that the progressivity of the current system would be to 
some extent higher if we were able to simulate additional annual income tax at 
progressive tax rates (10% and 15%). Flat tax reform is expected to trigger increase 
in PMT index to 1.022 (and PK to 0.1743), which means that the introduction of 
this reform scenario would increase the progressivity of the Serbian income tax 
system. These results are somewhat opposed to the results of empirical studies in 
developed countries, where introduction of the flat tax trigger affects adversely 
progressivity and income distribution. This difference is owing to the fact that 
current income tax in Serbia is far less progressive than PIT systems in developed 
countries. 
Although some positive effects on progressivity would be achieved through the 
introduction of flat tax, the results indicate that switching to the comprehensive 
income tax model would generate a much larger positive effect on tax progressivity. 
The introduction of a comprehensive income tax scheme would imply a rise in 
PMT index to 1.029 (Kakwani to 0.2189). However, the level of tax progressivity 22
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in Serbia would still be significantly lower than in the EU countries, where the 
average value of the index amounts to 1.0719.8
6. POVERTY EffECTS
The tax system has a pervasive impact on poverty, both directly through its role 
in the distribution of society’s resources, and indirectly through its effects on 
incentives for economic decisions (like working and saving).
The poverty statistics in this paper are calculated using the assumptions most 
frequently used in the poverty measurement literature. Differences in household 
size and composition are dealt with applying the modified OECD equivalence 
scale9 suggested by EUROSTAT.10 
The poverty line is set at 40% of the median of equivalent disposable income in 
the baseline scenario. The poverty line is fixed and used in both reform scenarios. 
Poverty incidence, intensity, and severity are measured using the family of 
measures proposed by Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (1984), which takes the 
following form:
 (3)
where l is the poverty line, xi the value of equalized income for the ith person’s 
household, and α is a measure of the sensitivity of the index to poverty. When 
α=0, the FGT index is the headcount index which measures the proportion of 
the population that is poor. It is popular because it is easy to understand and to 
measure poverty with it. But it does not indicate how poor the poor are. If α=1, 
FGT becomes the poverty gap index that measures the extent to which individuals 
fall below the poverty line (the poverty gaps), as a proportion of the poverty line. 
The poverty gap, however, is not sensitive to distribution of income among the 
poor. It is the squared poverty gap index, obtained for the α=2 values of the FGT 
index, which takes the inequality among the poor into account.
8  See: Peichl, A., et. al. (2008)
9  The modified OECD equivalence scale gives weight 1 for the first adult, 0.5 for remaining 
adults, and 0.3 for children under 14 years of age
10  For a discussion of using per capita measures instead of equivalence scales in obtaining 
comparable units of observation for the poverty measurement in Serbia, see Jovicic et al. 
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Table 4.  Poverty in Serbia under the alternative income tax scenarios
Baseline Flat tax Comprehensive 
income tax
Headcount ratio 0.13 0.11 0.11
Poverty gap 0.42 0.42 0.42
Squared poverty gap 0.023 0.023 0.023
1) Poverty line is set at 40% of the baseline median  
Source:  Authors’ calculations in SRMOD
As Table 4 shows, both alternative tax reform scenarios would reduce the number 
of poor in the population from 13% to 11%. The depth of poverty, as shown by 
the poverty gap, and poverty severity, expressed by the squared poverty gap, 
would remain unchanged. In this respect, both reform scenarios would have the 
same effect since neither of them leads to an increase in the disposable income of 
people in the bottom decile.
Next, we explore whether the changes affect any specific age group in particular. 
As Table 5 shows, poverty decreases by the same amount under both tax reform 
scenarios for the children and working population between 45 and 64 years of 
age. These effects are generated due to the introduction of monthly allowances for 
dependent children of RSD 4,000 (per child) in both reform scenarios.
Table 5.  Poverty rates by age
Current income 
tax system Flat tax Comprehensive 
income tax
Total 13 11
0-15 13.5 13.3 13.3
16-29 12.6 12.2 12.2
30-44 11.1 11.1 11.1
45-64 11.9 11.6 11.6
65+ 9.2 9.2 9.2
1) Poverty line is set at 40% of baseline median
Source:  Authors’ calculations in SRMOD
Although both reform scenarios would somewhat reduce inequality in income 
distribution, this would only trigger a slight decrease in poverty. The absence of 
larger poverty effects are due to the fact that the disposable income of the bottom 
decile group would remain almost unchanged. 24
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7. CONCLUSIONS
Empirical data on the structure of the Gini coefficient and relevant tax 
progressivity indices suggest that the equalizing effects and vertical equity in 
taxation under the current income tax regime in Serbia are very limited. These 
conclusions represent significant additional arguments in favour of income tax 
reform in Serbia. Although the income tax systems in EU member states are quite 
heterogeneous, it is evident that all of them apply some form of comprehensive, 
dual, or flat income tax. In the last decade most of the new EU member states 
have switched to a flat income tax, expecting to improve economic efficiency and 
some aspects of equity and to make the tax system simpler. 
It is commonly accepted, in academia as well as in policy circles, that reform of 
the personal income tax system in Serbia is necessary. Two frequently discussed 
reform options are the East European style flat tax and the comprehensive 
income tax model. Therefore in this paper we have analysed the effects of such 
reform scenarios on inequality, poverty, and vertical equity in taxation. Our 
intention was to provide ex-ante results relevant to evidence-based policy making 
processes, as well as to contribute to empirical literature on the distributional and 
poverty reducing effects of income tax reform.
The results show that both reform scenarios would help in tackling inequality. 
However, in terms of redistribution, as expected, the comprehensive income 
tax would perform better than the flat tax, due to the larger amount of income 
to be redistributed under this scheme. We find that flat tax, designed with the 
intention to be indirectly progressive, would trigger redistribution of income 
equal to 0.4% of total disposable income. The comprehensive tax model would 
redistribute 0.7% of total disposable income. Both reform scenarios would imply 
redistribution from the richest to the middle class, leaving the disposable income 
of the poorest unchanged. 
Our findings also indicate that under both tax reform scenarios tax progressivity/
vertical equity in taxation would be improved, which is mostly due to very limited 
progressivity and degree of vertical equity in the baseline scenario. As in the 
case of inequality effects, comprehensive income tax would also perform better 
in terms of progressivity than redesigned flat tax. However, the equalizing effects 
of the proposed reform scenarios would still be three to four times lower than in 
the EU countries. This implies that, if the intention of the tax reform is to address 
inequality in Serbia, actual reform scenarios should be even more progressive 
than our policy propositions. TAX EFFECTS ON INEQUALITY AND POVERTY
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The poverty effects of the tax reform scenarios are negligible, due to the fact that 
equalizing (redistributive) effects of all tax reform scenarios towards the poorest 
(two bottom deciles) are very limited. 
The distributional effects are important, but are not the only criteria that should 
be taken into account in the economic analysis of optimality of different tax policy 
models. Such analysis should also encompass the impact of tax reform options on 
economic efficiency (work and saving incentives), which is an interesting avenue 
for future research. 
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